On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and r
On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.
| Source | CVSS Version | Base Score | Severity | Vector String | Assessment Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NVDNIST | 3.1 | 9.6 | CRITICAL | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | 05/13/2026 |
| OSV3rd | 3.1 | 9.6 |
| CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 05/13/2026 |